mentality (part i): functionalism, materialism, and qualia

This is part one of three of an introduction to philosophy of mind, leading up to a discussion on the possibility of Artificial Intelligence, and what implications this may have on the notion of mentality. Questions that we will be exploring and trying to find answers to throughout this three part series include: What are mental states? What is pain? Can the mind be reduced to neuroscience? I warn you ahead of time that no tidy solutions to any of these questions will be presented to you on a silver platter. As is often the case with philosophical investigations, questions will remain unanswered, however it is the search for these answers that leads us to further understanding, as well as the creation of new and important questions.

Before we begin, we must first understand a few basic theories regarding mentality. The traditional view that is commonly attributed to the 17th century philosopher, René Descartes, is known as dualism. A dualist holds that there are two completely separate entities, namely the body and the mind, or the physical and the mental. These “substances” exist independently of each other; however, they do interact on a regular basis. In order to explain this mysterious interaction between the mental and the physical, Descartes affirmed that animal spirits—a substance neither mental nor physical, magically connects the two, and is conveniently located in the pituitary gland. Who knows why this is so; it is a point of humor in the always comedic field of philosophy of mind. Even more humorous though is the general acceptance of Cartesian dualism throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. Famous philosophers such as John Locke spoke of animal spirits as if they were a commonplace fact. Only the noble and exceedingly wise David Hume was able to step back from the Cartesian craze and ask his philosophical colleagues, “are you guys insane?” in more or less the same language, but in very much the same sentiment. Outside of philosophical circles, a dualistic worldview is very often held by the ordinary individual. It is very normal to talk about the “body” and “mind” as separate and distinct entities. “The body can not live without the mind,” Morpheus affirms—and we seem to understand what he means by this.

So, what is this mystical notion that we call “the mental”? How does it interact with the physical? It certainly seems as if we have nonphysical thoughts and ideas running through our “minds” all the time, so how can we explain these “mental states”? Dualism runs into problems when it tries to account for mental causation (mental interaction with the physical), and many philosophers have abandoned this ancient notion of mentality. Today, the most commonly held theory by experts in the field is known as functionalism. Functionalism is an account of what mental states actually are. Functionalists hold that mental states are internal states that perform certain functions—specifically producing certain behavioral outputs after receiving various inputs, and determining what resultant internal state the system or brain goes into. In short, mental states are defined by the functional role they play.

I want to focus on a certain type of functionalism known as Psychofunctionalism. This theory uses the same fundamental ideas of functionalism, but instead of being based in some sort of folk psychology, Psychofunctionalism is rooted in a very mature neuroscience. Paul Churchland, the current professor of University of California San Diego is a staunch Psychofunctionalist. He asserts that “the mental” is merely an illusion—everything boils down to neuroscience. This type of view is commonly known as an eliminative materialist—or, he wants to reduce mentality to a materialistic worldview via neuroscience. Intuitively, some of us may have a problem with this type of worldview—and perhaps rightly so. Many argue against this view claiming that neuroscience misses something key about human beings, namely qualia or experiential sensations. How can an eliminative materialist account for the “ouchiness of pain” or the “sadness of depression”? We like to think that these are the types of sensations that are only knowable through actually experiencing them—quite contrary to the notion that neuroscience can explain all there is to know about mentality. Do you think that an attempt to reduce everything to physicalism could be successful? We will address these types of questions and more in the next two parts of this series, leading up to the question, “is Artificial Intelligence possible?”