note: freecog contributor, Eriatlov, has composed a counterargument to this post, located under comments.
I recently touched upon the issue of violence, its justifications (or lack thereof), and its consequences. But I want to delve deeper. I do not believe that violence can be easily justified. Furthermore, I am not convinced that it can be justified at all. I hope that the majority of moral and even pseudo moral persons can agree that we must, we absolutely must, set an extremely high standard of justification for violence. I can not stress the importance of this enough. This is accentuated by my reluctance to accept any justification at all. Let us step back for a moment and investigate the implications that violence actually has on people.
Violence liberates. Chaotic and bloody revolutions have set the oppressed free from their oppressors. France experienced such in 1789, Haiti in 1791, America in 1775. It is true that freedom can be gained through violence. I have even heard that "violence is necessary" to achieve freedom, but I have not heard why this is so. Rather, I have not heard sufficient reason why this is so. First, I hear that violence is necessary because there is no other way. Immediately I am confused. No other way to do what? What is the goal here? Ah, freedom. Ah, justice. Apparently, it has been overwhelmingly evident to numerous groups throughout history (and today) that there was (and is) no other way to achieve freedom and justice other than through vicious murder and destruction. And let us be clear here, “violence” is a term that entails such things as murder, widespread destruction, suffering, and pain. As to freedom fighters, I sympathize. As to so-called deliverers of justice, I am horrified. How, I ask, is it possible that violence can lead to justice? Is not violence itself an injustice? I want this to be clear, so allow me to qualify my claim. I can understand the desire to use violence by the oppressed or abused. However, it is still unjustified. There is an important difference here, and it is not to be overlooked. Yes, we understand the oppressed lashing out in violent rage. But, is it justified? No.
The 20th century brought the world some unimaginably gruesome events. The very notion of a “world war” is disturbing to the point of nausea. However, the 20th century also brought us some inspiring people and ideas. Mahatma Gandhi demonstrated to the world that peaceful, non-violent, civil disobedience is a live option for revolutionaries in search of freedom. I am continually moved by the work of this man. His notion of a civil resistor is very different from what many other revolutionaries before him had envisioned.
The Duty of a Civil Resistor, according to Mahatma Gandhi:
• A satyagrahi, i.e., a civil resister, will harbor no anger.
• He will suffer the anger of the opponent.
• In so doing he will put up with assaults from the opponent, never retaliate; but he will not submit, out of fear of punishment or the like, to any order given in anger.
“When a person places the proper value on freedom, there is nothing under the sun that he will not do to acquire that freedom.” You most likely recognize the sentiment of Malcolm X. Invigorating words, certainly, but what does this type of thought actually represent? He’s famous for another saying, “by any means necessary,” and this is exactly what a peaceful world should fear. I do not wish to weigh the importance of freedom on one hand and the importance of peace on the other. Instead, I want to consider what type of action is permissible under doctrine similar to that of Malcolm X. The killing of one man is certainly tolerable. The killing of ten, fifteen, or five hundred is similarly an acceptable “price to pay” for freedom. I am not specifying whether these people are civilians or not, so how about civilians? How about bombing an urban city in order to protect freedom?—ring any bells? The Japanese hear them. Is genocide acceptable? At the very least, these questions are worth careful consideration.
I used the common terminology “price to pay” in the previous paragraph in order to point out just how despicable this type of thinking is. In order to tolerate a “by any means necessary” theory, you must think of people as commodities. You must think of people as a means to an end, as objects of utility. Is that what we are? Are people merely a means to some end? Even if the end is as noble as freedom, I refuse to accept the inhumane premise.
4.18.2005
a meditation on violence
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18 comments:
I'm afraid I must respectfully disagree with this position. Firstly, by rhetorically asking "is not violence itself an injustice?" you are assuming that which you should be attempting to prove. Without objective justification, the "injustice of violence" is simply another cliche. Furthermore, you support your conclusions using specific, extreme examples. While this is not wrong in itself, without deductive support, it fails provide evidence for a universal claim that "violence is always wrong". As they are used, the examples simply provide an emotional appeal that may or may not have any true grounding. Certainly, there are many instances, as in the examples that you mention, wherein the cost of violence was greater than the benefit. Bringing up Hiroshima and asking for the opinions of the Japanese about it will certainly provoke a negative reaction to violence, but the situation that should truly be considered is the one where a single person suffers a little, while the rest of humanity benefits tremendously. According to the doctrine that universalizes the wrongness of harm, this should be "wrong". perhaps it is "unjust" by many definitions, but this word is truly meaningless. In a sense, it would be "unjust" to give benefit to a few even at no cost to anyone. This does not make it "wrong", another problematic term, or undesirable. Even ignoring these points, assuming, as is done in the article, that causing suffering is wrong, imagine the following situation. The entire world is ruled by one prince. This prince is cruel beyond imagining, and takes everything from the people to himself. People are starving on the streets, living in boxes. The prince lives in a locked room with a button that can destroy the world. I, who may or may not have a personal stake in the matter, am walking by the palace and notice that one of the servants has forgotten to lock the prince's door. I peer in, and he is asleep. I have a knife in my hand. I only have time to run in and kill him before a sentry comes by and renders the opportunity void. By killing him, I would be making him suffer. Yet doing so would free the world from needless slavery, and save countless lives and happinesses. This chance will likely never occur again. If I were to refuse to kill him, the effect of my INaction would be the suffering of millions. I am guilty either way, and likely utilarian principles should guide my choice. (These contradictions and paradoxes in morality are to me evidence of its nonexistence, but that is an argument for another time) This can be applicable to revolutionary situations as well. If a government is being responsible for the suffering of many, the people may, as you state, have the option for various nonviolent protests. However, as history has shown, these are often ineffective and slow. Americans tried nonviolent means and protests to britain at first, but these were to no avail. Exaggerating slightly the injustices inflicted upon them by the British, each moment of inaction could be a cause for more suffering. In this case, if the revolutionary has a duty, it is to BE violent. Words like "justified" are misleading and unclear. If causing suffering is unjustified, then one is unjustified whatever one does in such a situation. There are times where we can weigh the suffering caused by war with the suffering prevented by it, but this approach does not support the "violence is always wrong" idea. While quotes in themselves prove nothing, I shall nonetheless endeavor to provide a relevant one to epilogue my contention.
"All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing."
Edmund Burke
The sentiment that “violence itself is an injustice” is not introduced as the result of a logical proof. Actually, it is my opinion and a moral stance. It is up to the reader to agree or disagree with this position based on their respective moral resolves. Merely saying that this claim has no “objective justification” does not oust its relevance or prospective validity. That being said, allow me to demonstrate why I think your critique stems from a misunderstanding of my position.
You have inaccurately identified my objective. I have not set out to prove that violence is unjustifiable, as you suggest. The burden of proof does not sit on my shoulders here. Instead, it is the job of advocators of violence to justify violence. All I am doing is pointing out the lack of an existent successful justification, and why this is so. So, until a satisfactory justification is given for violent action, I will continue to announce that there is none (and critique inadequate attempts), while remaining on reasonable philosophical ground.
Something further needs to be clarified as well. You say that I assume that causing suffering is wrong; however, this is not the case. The mere occurrence of pain or suffering does not entail that an immoral act has occurred. Causing suffering does not entail immorality. You may accidentally run over a person who darts in front of your car as you are driving along. This does not entail morality, you could not have avoided killing this person. In this situation, killing is not wrong. This is not an act of violence. In order for an act to be wrong there must be an intention to cause harm or suffering. Intentionality is important here.
The prince in palace example is a common one. Often people will phrase it as, “if you could have killed Hitler when he was a baby, would you have?” The appeal of this type of example is quite obvious. Murdering Hitler, or the prince, saves countless people, prevents suffering, in sum, it prevents many harmful things. I do not deny that these things are beneficial. I do not deny that murdering the prince leads to a good outcome. However, despite these beneficial consequences, the murder is not justified. Beneficial consequences do not substitute for a justification of the action. The act of murdering the prince is still wrong, you have violated the rights of the prince; you have violated a human being in the worst way: murder. Murdering a murderer is still unjustifiable.
What is the alleged justification? Perhaps some appeal to ‘eye for an eye’ morality?—“He has killed (or will kill) many people, therefore I can justifiably kill him.” This is unacceptable. The taking of a human life, against the wishes of the person, is simply the vilest, most disgusting, disregard for the importance of life. An appeal to “but it would save so many people if you take this mans life away” is an appeal to what I call the hero factor. Hollywood does this frequently. Heroes kill bad guy after bad guy in the name of supposed justice, and we love him for it. Stop and think for a moment, what is going on here?
Before I analyze the Hitler example, I want to clarify something which has been befuddled. You say, “If I were to refuse to kill him, the effect of my INaction would be the suffering of millions. I am guilty either way.” This a complete falsity. If you choose not to kill him, you do not suddenly become responsible for his actions. This type of claim is completely absurd, and it is a misplacement of guilt and responsibility. Now, if this is understood, allow me to continue.
Consider the following analysis of the Hitler example:
Which is morally better: (a) the person does not commit the murder and thus widespread suffering ensues (remember, this does not mean that the person is the cause of the widespread suffering) or (b) the person commits the murder and widespread suffering is prevented. The latter is certainly more heroic. The former is undoubtedly a more tragic situation; widespread suffering and death as opposed to just one death.
Choosing (a) means that the person is not a murderer – he has not taken a human life. He has not ended the existence of another human entity. Realize the gravity of the previous statement.
Choosing (b) means that the person is now a murderer – a heroic murder, yes – but a murderer all the same. This type of heroic killing is advertised again and again in popular culture. Almost any violent Hollywood movie involves the heroic killing of one or several “bad guys” in order to save the helplessly innocent “good guys.” Choosing (b) is popular! It is easy! It is what today’s culture advocates. Heroes are what the public wants, right? But are heroes moral champions also?
I want to point out something important here. There seems to be a tendency to have the option for a happy ending, or a frantic search for a noble and right action, when it simply is not there. It is difficult to accept that when given two options both are unjustifiable. We tend to want one to be justifiable. We have in one hand the option to kill Hitler, and we have in the other Hitler murdering people. They are both wrong. Hitler murdering people is wrong. We hopefully can agree on this. Murdering Hitler (before, during, or after his murdering) is also wrong. Neither action is right, despite an understandable desire for at least one of them to be so. Popular cultures advocates happy endings and heroic gestures; however, it is imperative that we seriously consider the legitimacy of these popular tendencies.
As for the revolutionary example, refer to Gene Sharp’s 198 methods of inaction. Revolutionaries do not use violence because they have no other options. They use violence because they become tired of failure through nonviolent means, and therefore turn to violent action out of frustration. I sympathize with many revolutionaries; however, there violent actions were not “necessarily” as is sometimes claimed. They may indeed be an express route, an easy route, and a convenient way of releasing frustration, but they are neither justified nor necessary. Nonviolence is a live option.
And lastly, to respond to the Burke quotation: “A witty saying proves nothing.” Voltaire
Firstly, I am aware of the qualifications of intent put onto violence, though I did not expressly state it, but intent is present in my arguments, so that contention is irrelevant. Also, in your post you DID state that you believed violence was never justified, and that seems to be the primary purpose and challenge of your article. I believe I have shown that it can be justified. I have also decided that the term "justified" is ambiguous, and should probably be replaced with "correct". What I am attempting to show is that even accepting your suspect insistence on the "wrongness" of taking human life, violence can still be justified. I wouls also like to stress with indignation that I have not and would not use "eye for an eye" as a reason for any action. As to your contention regarding the prince situation, your error lies in your claim that I would not be "responsible" (another problematic term) for the subsequent murders of the prince. One thing is true, that I am only responsible for my own actions, and it certainly does not reflect on me if only the prince does something wrong. The key is that inaction in itself is a choice, and the choice must be judged by its foreseeable consequences. Saying that I am not responsible for the deaths of whoever the prince kills is a meaningless technicality. Certainly, I did not kill them by my own hand, but I did make a choice that I could just as easily have not made and that had the foreseeable consequence of causing the suffering of millions. Whether or not I directly stabbed them is irrelevant. For example, two men are burning alive in a locked room, to which I have the only key. I did not put them into the room. It is the fire that directly causes their suffering. Yet the choice not to turn the key is as real as the choice to do so, and the invisible "distance" between me and their suffering does not exonerate me from being at fault for their needless pain. Also, simply because hollywood promotes something doesnt make it wrong (though it is often the case). Their reasons may not be well thought out, but at least in this their conclusion is correct. As to the next point, that both actions may be "unjustified", I would imagine this is a misunderstanding based on the vagueness of the semantics involved. What we are trying to ascertain is what a person in the given situation "should do". He must either act or not act, and we are attempting to analyze, assuming the "violence is wrong" morality, what decision the person should make. In this situation, there must be a "better" choice, which, showing the insufficience of simple "violence is wrong" outlook (I would intentionally cause violence whichever choice I make), I base on utilarian principles (which are reasonable to apply when other considerances are taken care of). I would also ask that you do not confuse my intentions with a "frantic search for a noble and right action", as nothing could be further from the truth. I would make a completely different argument than is presented here, but to simplify the matter I have assumed your morality and shown that even you should come to the same conclusion. Were we to assume my morality (or rather, deny any) we would be discussing an entirely different problem. For your benefit I have taken the situation from your perspective. Lastly, concerning the nonviolent methods you propose, I refer you to my earlier demonstration. While those alternatives do exist, there are clearly situations where they are either wholly void or at the very least marginally effective, such as the situation with the prince, locked in a room with his button. By selecting these as a third choice (beyond killing him or doing nothing) a moral man still does not free himself from the fact that even if his attempts are eventually successful (nigh impossible in this situation and many others), every day longer that it takes as compared to a simple murder is another day of suffering and death for those concerned. Nonviolence cannot be used as an escape from moral responsibility for the results of ones actions or freely chosen inaction. I stand by my previous position.(Incidentally, I quoted merely to illustrate, and am quite aware of its inadmissibility as evidence, hence my disclaimer)
As to your claim that responsibility somehow transfers to the person who refuses to commit murder, I provide the following example to demonstrate the radical falseness of this assertion.
Recall the Hitler example, with a twist. The twist is that you and Hitler are having a conversation. It is not an option for you to kill Hitler (either there are armed guards protecting him, or he is behind some sort of impenetrable glass, so on and so forth, you decide). An innocent person (a girl, boy, friend, stranger, adult, child, again you decide—it does not matter in the least) is in the room with you, tied up by Hitler. Hitler presents you with two choices. Choice (a): You must kill the person, and iff you do this, Hitler will prevent the death of a plethora of people. Choice (b): You do not kill the person, in which case the person is set free; however, the plethora of people are killed by Hitler. In either case, you are free to go unharmed after the decision is made. You choose (b). You choose (b); you do not kill the person. You are unable to bring yourself to end a human life—you can not bring yourself to intend to kill somebody (do not jump the gun, choosing (b) does not logically entail that you intend for the plethora of people to die. I will demonstrate this for you clearly in a moment). You then proceed to take action. You scream at Hitler, “Do not kill those people.” You write letters to Hitler, to the press, to anyone who will listen. You even offer Hitler your own life in exchange for the lives of the masses. See Gene Sharp’s 198 methods of nonviolent action for more options. Nonetheless, Hitler does not listen, a plethora of people are murdered. Nonviolent action has failed insofar as it has not prevented the death of these people, but that does not instill guilt into the nonviolent actor. You are absolutely NOT responsible for the death of the plethora of people, by any stretch of the imagination. It simply makes no logical sense to say the person who chooses nonviolent action is responsible for the actions of the Hitler character. If this is not already obvious, allow me to elicit the blatancy. When you decide to take nonviolent action (i.e.; you decide not to kill the innocent person that is tied up, and you decide to try to prevent Hitler by nonviolent action instead of through murder) you do not intend for the plethora of people to die—your claim to the contrary is actually quite random, I did not notice even an attempt to validate this outrageous claim. Instead, by not killing the innocent person you intend for them to live, and by nonviolently acting on behalf of the plethora, you are intending for them not to die. Now it is completely lucid why complete responsibility lies on the shoulders of Hitler and his goons. The nonviolent actor is not morally responsible; any claim to the contrary has no rational basis—it is merely a tactic to install guilt into people who choose nonviolence instead of Hollywood heroics.
(Note: This is implicit, and slightly explicit throughout the previous example. Inaction is not what I advocate. Quite contrarily, I advocate nonviolent action. Gandhi was not an inactive man—a vast understatement.)
As to Hollywood, you have missed the point. I absolutely never claimed that the act of Hollywood advocating something causes it to be wrong. Instead, I postulated that perhaps Hollywood is one of the pop cultures that makes this type of heroic violence somehow seem justifiable, when quite clearly it is not (as you have not given any situation exemplifying the contrary).
I did not notice any potent threats to the notion that violence is unjustifiable, though I searched vigorously.
Violence should not be tolerated regardless of the explanation that follows the act itself and its consequences.
If we were to forgive an act of violence due to these high standards that we are compelled to set, what would we consider a “high standard” when hearing a genuine defense, and who is to say that the justification suits the act of violence?
Once again, your statements lack sufficient grounding in reason. I am quite confused as to your insistence that "You cannot bring yourself to end another human life. You cannot bring yourself to intend to kill someone." Certainly I can, for the reasons I have already described. Your style is also offensive and based on accusation of intent which is quite wrong. It brings to mind campaign "attack ads" and propaganda rhetoric. It does not further your argument in a logical sense to claim that another point of view, which, incidentally, has much more objective grounding than your own, is "a tactic to install guilt into people who practice nonviolence." You also claim that I have not provided an example in which violence would be justified, when I have proposed just such a situation. Conveniently, you ignore my situation entirely in your argument. Regardless, my logic applies equally well to your new Hitler situation. You claim that my assertion of intent is "random", and that I did not even try to validate it. Allow me to explain it quite simply. Certainly you would prefer that no one die, but what i would LIKE to happen has no bearing on the intent. If it did, then I would not be unjustified in killing him, or anyone, as long as i would have preferred that he live. Intent in the way we must consider it is the knowledge of the consequences of a choice and the decision to choose it anyway. You also seem to misinterpret my argument considering inaction. I was simply stating that inaction is an action in itself. It has nothing to do with what one does afterwards, as you say gandhi would do. If gandhi would not kill the person, he would be exercising the inaction i am speaking of (for better or for worse). Before your pompous assertion that your argument is quite "lucid", you claim that "by acting nonviolently on behalf of the plethora you are intending for them not to die." This may be true, however, so might the statement "by violently acting on behalf of the plethora you are intending for them to die." Almost certainly, i'm sure you would agree, that by "violently acting against the plethora, you are intending for them to die." However, as i have held, and you have not denied, inaction and action are both choices and a type of "action" in their own way. Hence, this statement would also be true: "By violently INacting against the plethora, you are intending them to die." The situation is parallel to the following: You are in a room with two buttons. One button will kill everyone in the world except Albert Berriz. The other button will kill Albert Berriz. If no button is pressed within ten seconds, everybody in the world including Mr. Berriz will be killed. Every possible choice is a violent one. By INacting, and waiting for the required ten seconds, you are being violent against the people just the same. If you managed to yell at the empty room for the 10 seconds "HEY PLEASE DONT KILL THEM!!!! TAKE ME INSTEAD!!!!" though you know no one is listening, that does not magically remove responsibility for your choice. As to your final paragraph, it is an insult without any supportive relevance to the topic, and I should suggest that you look a little MORE "vigorously". As to worth_09, I have absolutely no idea what you are trying to say in your second paragraph and would respectfully ask that you present it in a clearer way.
You can not change the meaning of words in order to aid your argument. You say, “Intent in the way we must consider it is the knowledge of the consequences of a choice and the decision to choose it anyway.” This is not intent. ‘Intent’ is an aim or a goal that guides action. This is the definition of intent for our purposes, as well as the definition of intent generally. In other words, this is not only what I want ‘intent’ to mean, this is what ‘intent’ means, as used normally.
Now lets move on.
Since the following sentence is false, your entire argument fails. “"By violently INacting against the plethora, you are intending them to die.” You are not violently acting (or INacting) if the people die; the person that murdered them is. This is the exact same transference of responsibility that has gone on throughout your examples and arguments. In your two button example, if you do nothing, you are not acting violently (nor are you “INacting violently”—simply because the result is that people die, does not logically entail that you intended for them to die, nor does it mean that you acted violently.) You are forced into this situation, and that does not _logically_ entail that you acquire guilt if you do not murder someone in order to save other people (no matter the number). I will explore this notion further, because I want to make two issues crystal clear: logical entailment and intention.
Here is why your two button example does not logically hold:
You make it seem as if there are only three choices, (a) you press the button to kill the lesser number of people and that person dies, (b) you press the button to kill the larger number of people and those people die, or (c) you do not press any buttons and everyone dies.
(the intentions based your interpretation of each situation)
(a) you intend for the person to die
(b) you intend for the people to die
(c) you intend for everyone to die
This evaluation is simply wrong. In reality, (c) does not logically entail that you intend for everyone to die. Choosing (c) means that you do not intend to kill the person, nor do you intend to kill the people. You intend to kill no one. According to your situation, if you choose (c), then somebody or some thing will kill everyone. Still, you did not cause this, you did not intend for them to die. Whoever arranged for the bombs to be placed, and set them off, is the one who intended to kill the people.
You are also missing other possible situations that can not logically be ruled out, save your belief in prophecy.
(d) you do not press either button, and the bombs do not go off, it was a bluff
(e) you do not press either button, the bomb malfunctions, nobody dies
If these things happen, by your previous claims, you would say that you intended for (d) or (e), just like you allegedly (falsely) say that you would intend (c) if it occurs. It is completely obvious that if (d) or (e) occurred that you would not have intended for them to occur. Similarly, would not have intended (c) to occur, if (c) occurs.
Your comparison of my arguments to campaign ads is not in good taste, I would have hoped that this type of sentiment could be avoided. I remain by my hypothesis that perhaps your argument is a tactic to instill guilt into people who practice nonviolence, though this is not crucial, in the least, to the main argument at hand. All that matters is that you have not provided a situation in which violence is justifiable. In order to do this, you must show a situation in which nonviolent action logically entails the intent to commit murder. A logical entailment of intent is NECESSARY—and you have not shown this.
Logically, you have not shown that the nonviolent action entails intent to kill people. This is why your argument does not work, and this is why your examples fail again and again.
This will be the last post I will make about this subject, partly because I this could go back and forth forever, and partly because I am tired of assuming your peculiar morality. Mostly, however, I am confident that an intelligent, objective observer will have enough information to judge the situation correctly, and little further evidence needs to be shown from my position. Nonetheless, I shall debunk your last set of complaints as I have the rest. Again, I will give you the benefit of the doubt and assume your new definition of "intent" being "a goal or aim used to guide one's actions." Now, what we have been arguing is whether violence is unconditionally wrong. You have defined violence as harm with "intent". You claim we cannot judge
intent by foreseeable consequences, as I have proposed. Yet again, I will accept your belief. In this case, I cannot show that violence, "causing harm with the goal or aim guiding one's actions being to cause harm" because of the restrictions you apply to the definitions. Assuming your morality and accepting your definitions, violence must always be wrong. Alas! It appears my cause must be lost! But wait! Could it be!? Yes! It is! Thanks to your specifications, The situations we describe no longer fit under that category! If my "intent" (goal or aim guiding my actions) in killing the prince is the preservation of lives rather than the destruction of them, the act does not qualify under your definition of violence!
Q.E.D.
Given, this does not prove it is right or wrong, and the original argument, with a newly "polished" definition of violence, would still go to you. It is, however, a lesson. If you insist on modifying your definitions to fit your needs, take care that they still apply to the situations that you are really trying to prove. As I have said, however, I won't pursue the issue further, and let the objective audience decide for themselves. I will allow you the last word, which I am sure you will take to pose more contentions (which I could of course summarily dispose of as well), but I am confident my arguments stand quite well on their own. Hopefully, next time we can argue on MY moralistic turf, where words like "Good", "Evil", "Just", "Unjust", "Right", and "Wrong", all those (meaningless) terms that lead to confusion and paradox, do not exist. 'Till next we spar.
If you kill the prince in order to save people, your intent is twofold. First, you intend for the prince to die. If you decide to kill the prince, then the goal ‘to kill the prince’ is necessarily at least one of your goals—even if there are other goals as well. In other words, the actual killing of the prince necessarily means that you fulfilled your goal or aim to kill him (that is, if the act is not accidental). Second, you intend for this action to have some effect, namely to save people. In sum, by the definition that has been consistently used, this is violence. And of course, as has been shown repeatedly, killing the prince is morally unjustifiable, qed.
It is somewhat unexpected that you resorted to this type of attitude: “I am not going to respond, but if I did, ohhh but if I did, boy would you get it!!” I am sure that the objective audience will take into consideration that you could have defeated my arguments if you had wanted to, you simply elected not to.
It has been a pleasure.
Hello, my name is AbsolutelyNotEriatlov. Anyone claiming that I am Eriatlov is a big fat liar. Eriatlov has ceased to post on this subject, and would never deign to go back on his word, as he is the greatest of all philosophers and men, and should be worshipped as the savior of man.
I would just like to point out, in my own decidedly nonEriatlovian way, that there is a problem with your claim that "if you decide to kill the prince, it must have been part of your intent". I interpret this statement as either meaning that decisions and their consequences show intent, which you have refused to accept previously, or that any direct act must have the intent of the act itself. If the former is true, I refer one back to the arguments Eriatlov made with that very assumption. If the latter is true, remember Eriatlov's brilliant example of the button situation. If I press the button that would enable someone to kill the single person, I am, by your claim, certainly intending to press the button, but i do not kill the person, and therefore am not necessarily intending them to die. It is not in this case, as you put it "an actual killing".
This brings up an extremely interesting alternate point of view of the situation, which is the real reason I am posting. As I am not near to the immaculate, transcendent genius of Eriatlov, I will not analyze it, but will simply give it to the community for discussion. Take the exact same (button) situation. Every aspect of the issue is exactly the same. But let us pose it this way: The people of the world are in danger of death in 10 seconds. You are in a room with two buttons. One will save Albert Berriz, the other will save every other person on the planet. As one can see, the situation itself is identical. Does the way the question is posed change the solution? If so, why? If not, how can any course of action in this situation be called "violent"? Discuss amongst yourselves.
A few of the comments towards the end were leading to unfriendly directions, so we decided it would be best to omit these and start anew. If anyone who still has things to say on this very interesting issue, including those whose posts were deleted, please feel free to say it; but, please do it cordially. We apologize for this, censorship is not our goal, so please feel free to speak as friends.
wow, this is putting a comments section to good use.
in an evolutionary sense, you could argue that violence is a mere piece of the cycle of life. violence provides food, provides domain, safety.
however, in an evolutionary sense, we have seen how suppression of violence has furthered our species. for all of our failings, humans are capable transcendant cooperation.
then again, we are capable of violence not seen in animals. suicide for instance. violence borne of hate and not necessity.
in a spiritual/faith example, the christian perspective (though debatable as to what that is) provides a model of a doctrine of non-violence.
whereas the jury is still out on whether ghandi's passive rebellion worked (it could be years and years before we know), we DO know that the sacrifice of jesus -- whether believed to be divine or not -- is largely responsible for the defeat of the roman empire as it was known.
it was a war of ideas. and it was won without violence, at least from side of the battle.
e+
The sacrifice of Jesus was responsible for the fall of the Roman Empire? Perhaps you are saying that the transformation of the "Empire" to Christianity played a role in the fall? The former claim is far different from the latter. What historical evidence do you cite to justify saying "Jesus caused the empire to fall." Additionally, the term "Roman Empire" is ambiguous, which may be adding to the confusion.
The concept of injustice is morality-based and highly subjective. What might seem unjust to one people may seem just to another. For this reason, the question of "is violence an injustice" cannot be universally addressed. Violence is committed against people and therefore, is often justified to some.
All we can do is practice our own sense of justice, realizing and accepting that we may indeed be the victim of anothers.
Violence does not bring order. The threat of violence, on the other hand, does.
Malcolm X wasn't advocating violence for violence's sake, he was telling the establishment, "I have a colleague who's marching in Alabama. I'd listen to him if I were you."
I agree that theoretically there is never a justification for violence. An American may justify the Atomic bombing of Hiroshima by saying the bombing saved the lives of American soldiers. However, that same American would not accept Al Qaeda's justification that 9/11 was necessary to save Muslim lives. The problem is any violent act can be justified in some way by the perpetrator(s) and those who support them.
If every member of the human race agreed that violence was never justified then violence could never occur. We wouldn't have to kill Hitler when he was a baby because Hitler would have accepted that the use of violence was not an acceptable way to return Germany to greatness. We wouldn't have to kill oppressive rulers because they could not exist without violence.
Practically, of course, the entire human race will never stop using violence as a means to an end, which means we will always have acts of violence, which lead to endless acts of retaliatory violence. An act of violence can set in motion more acts of violence for generations to come. Most conflicts today are the result of a previous conflict, which is the result of a previous conflict, which is the result of a previous conflict, etc.
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